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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to assess the attitudes of banking employees on the ethics 
of tax evasion. The study of the ethics on banking employees is particularly relevant, given 
that, since the 2008 crisis, the confidence in the sector has not been fully recovered, 
particularly in Portugal, due to several recent cases of bankruptcy and people who have lost 
their lifesavings due to malpractices in the banking industry. 
To address this issue, a survey was designed, based on the tax ethics literature and previous 
studies, and administered to banking employees from a bank institution operating in Portugal. 
The survey addresses several issues like tax ethics, tax morals, tax evasion and tax 
compliance and the sample obtained consisted of 71 observations. 
The results point to the existence of a high level of tax ethics on banking employees. The 
study didn’t found older people to be more ethical in their attitudes towards tax evasion, 
while women did not present higher levels of tax evasion than men. There were not found 
differences on the ethics towards tax evasion between religious and non-religious people. 
In order to construct a more complete picture of ethics in the Portuguese banking system, it 
would be interesting extending this survey at a national level with access to employees of the 
biggest bank institutions operating in Portugal. 
 
JEL Classification: H26 
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Resumo 
O principal objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar as atitudes dos funcionários da banca em relação 
à ética na evasão fiscal. O estudo da ética nos funcionários da banca é particularmente 
relevante, dado que, desde a crise de 2008, a confiança no setor ainda não foi totalmente 
recuperada, particularmente em Portugal, devido a vários casos recentes de falências e de 
pessoas que perderam as suas poupanças em virtude a más práticas bancárias. 
De forma a abordar esta questão, foi construído um questionário, com base na literatura e em 
estudos anteriores, e aplicado a funcionários de uma instituição bancária que opera em 
Portugal. Este questionário aborda várias questões como ética fiscal, moral tributária, evasão 
fiscal e cumprimento fiscal, sendo a amostra constituída por 71 observações. 
Os resultados apontam para a existência de um elevado nível de ética fiscal nos funcionários 
da banca. O estudo não permitiu constatar que as pessoas mais velhas apresentam um maior 
nível de ética relativamente à evasão fiscal. Por outro lado, as mulheres não apresentaram 
níveis mais elevados de ética fiscal do que os homens. Não foram encontradas diferenças 
entre pessoas religiosas e não religiosas em relação ao seu nível de ética fiscal.  
De forma a ter uma imagem mais completa da ética fiscal no sistema bancário português, 
seria interessante alargar a amostra a nível nacional, com o acesso às respostas dos 
funcionários das maiores instituições bancárias em Portugal. 
Classificação JEL: H26 
Palavras-chave: Ética Fiscal, Fraude Fiscal, Ética, Contribuintes, Moral Tributária, 
Cumprimento Fiscal, Banca 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Framework 
Since the introduction of taxes by the Romans, with studies suggesting customs and excise 
duties as the earliest form of taxation, to property taxes imposed in Britain centuries ago, as 
reported by Mckerchar (2003), a lot has  necessarily changed to reach the modern tax systems 
across countries. 
Nowadays, one of the most important questions that governments have to address is if enough 
taxes are being collected from tax payers (OECD, 2013), providing tax revenues in order to 
enable governments to invest in development, infrastructures, to deliver public services and 
to combat poverty and guarantee social benefits to the citizens. 
The importance of this topic is highlighted by the Portuguese Strategic Plan of Tax Fraud 
and Evasion Combat for the 2015-2017 triennial (Governo de Portugal, 2015), pointing the 
fight against tax fraud and customs evasion reinforcement as the priority vector of fiscal 
policy, in order to ensure a fair distribution of the tax effort and to sanction tax fraud more 
effectively. Also, according to Murphy (2012), tax evasion is a serious issue for the European 
Union with estimates of approximately 860 billion euros of taxes evaded per year and shadow 
economies representing 22.1% of total economic activities. 
As referred by Torgler and Murphy (2004), the voluntary payment of taxes is an important 
issue for tax administrations worldwide, as some suggest it is by deterrence from fear of 
being caught, by opposition to the theory that there is a sense of tax morals, an intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes affecting compliance behaviour. Therefore, it is of the utmost 
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importance to address the tax ethics studies in order to better understand the role of ethics in 
individual behaviour and in tax compliance, in particular in the case of banking employees 
where these situations are being so questioned lately. 
The most famous quote, regarding taxation, from Benjamin Franklin, “In this world nothing 
can be said to be certain, except death and taxes”, illustrates well the importance of the topic 
in study. 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to assess the attitudes of banking employees on the 
ethics of tax evasion. For that purpose, a survey was applied to banking employees, based on 
the tax ethics literature and previous studies, mainly McGee (2006; 2014). Through the 
analysis of several social-demographic variables it is intended to identify the factors that 
influence tax compliance. 
The study of this sample is very important due to the low confidence level in the financial 
industry, with several cases of banking scandals and financial fraud, as highlighted by 
Wehinger (2013), and with the health of the banking system being much questioned. Also, a 
survey conducted within employees in the financial sector from the United States and the 
United Kingdom by Labaton Sucharow LLP (2012), reveals that despite the reforms to fix 
the financial sector and improve governance the respondents still present high levels of 
probability to engage in less ethical conducts. Cohn et al. (2014) found that bank employees 
behave honestly, despite the culture in the banking industry favouring dishonest behaviour 
contributing to its poor reputation. The authors believe that is very important to re-establish 
an honest culture in the banking industry. 
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The importance of studying attitudes on tax ethics is stressed in the literature as example of 
Onu (2016) affirming that taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax evasion to be positively related to 
compliance behaviour. This topic was studied in several papers by McGee (2006; 2014), 
stating the importance of analysing tax compliance from the ethics approach. These studies 
evaluated the opinions on the ethics of tax evasion in several groups as philosophy professors 
and international business academics. 
The present work aims to study tax evasion from a social and psychological point of view 
according to the last decade tendencies, with focus on the psychological variables and moral 
values forming attitudes towards tax compliance. This investigation intends to answer the 
following research questions: “The attitudes of banking employees on the ethics of tax 
evasion and their beliefs towards tax compliance are in line with the past literature findings?” 
and “Do banking employees present high levels of tax ethics?” 
1.3 Project Structure 
In the first part of this work, the literature review will address the most important questions 
regarding the tax topic, based in past research. Next, the hypotheses to test will be introduced, 
followed by a discussion of the data and methodology used in the elaboration of this 
dissertation. In the results section, the surveys will be analysed. Finally, the main conclusions 
will be presented as well as the limitations of this study and further research topics. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The discussion about why taxpayers pay or not pay their taxes has always been very 
inconclusive, and one cannot say there is a perfect tax structure which is able to face the 
needs across every country. As described by Mckerchar (2003), the main objective of 
taxation is to collect enough revenues to fund the government expenditures. 
Pereira (2011) defines taxes as monetary payments due to the state or other public entities in 
order to achieve public purposes. Tax is a compulsory levy by the government on people's 
income or wealth, without a direct quid pro quo, as described by Song and Yarbrough (1978). 
The first study about this topic was introduced by Becker (1968), analysing illegal behaviour 
through an economic model including penalties, sanctions and probability of detection, 
where individuals would or wouldn’t engage in criminal activities by evaluating the expected 
benefits and costs. Later, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) developed one of the most important 
tax evasion model, concluding that taxpayers choose the amount to evade in a way to 
maximize their expected utility given a certain probability of detection. As such, this is 
considered a relevant research topic, as shown by previous studies. 
The main objective of this chapter is to present ideas, lines of thought and past research on 
the ethics of tax evasion, presenting a strong theoretical base for this dissertation. First, the 
tax evasion topic will be examined with emphasis on the first important studies regarding 
this issue. It is followed by a detailed analysis of the two main tax compliance theories: 
economic deterrence models and social and fiscal psychologic models. Next, the tax morals 
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topic will be addressed, ending with the tax ethics subject and a presentation of the most 
important variables used in the tax ethics studies. 
2.2 Tax Evasion 
Alm and Torgler (2011) define tax evasion as illegal and intentional actions in order to reduce 
tax obligations, by underreporting incomes, sales and wealth, or overstating deductions, 
exemptions and credits, or failing to file appropriate tax returns. Slemrod (2007) describes it 
as a situation where a person, committing fraud, pays less tax than is obligated to, while Benk 
et al. (2015) refers to its existence since governments started collecting taxes. 
Expected utility theory developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) considers taxpayers as 
utility maximizers in their tax reporting and compliance decisions, viewing tax evasion as 
worthwhile if the financial gains compensate the financial costs, by deliberate 
underreporting. The important decision of underreporting depends on whether or not there 
will be an audit from the tax authorities, which could lead to a decrease in the income due to 
the penalties applied for the act of tax evasion.  The contingency about the probability of 
being detected, leads to uncertainty weather to evade taxes or not. Two fundamental 
substituting policy tools, according to these authors, are sanctions over which the tax 
authority exercises direct control, and probability of detection that depends of the resources 
spent on detecting tax evasion. Contrary to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974) 
suggested that tax rate should have no effect on the tax evasion equation, as the penalty 
should increase pari passu with the tax rate. Srinivasan (1973) also views taxpayers as utility 
maximizers, stating that the probability of detection is independent from the income, leading 
to an increase on the evasion level as result of an income increase.  
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Attention is drawn by Cowell (1985) to the existence of an important boundary between tax 
evasion and avoidance, which is not always easy to distinguish. The simple division that can 
be considered is a legal one: tax evasion is an illegal practice of not paying taxes and beyond 
the law, as tax avoidance isn’t, with the taxpayer trying to minimize taxes, using methods 
approved by the Internal Revenue Service in an abusive way. Tax avoidance involves using 
loopholes in the tax law with the purpose of reducing liabilities, as described by Sandmo 
(2004). In certain situations tax avoidance can be considered as bad as tax evasion, from a 
moral perspective, and should not be treated differently. Another important concept 
presented by Pereira (2011) is tax planning, a legal way to minimize taxes using strategies 
given by tax authority, as tax benefits and tax exemptions.  
The question about who evades taxes is addressed by Slemrod (2007), affirming there 
appears to be a pattern consistent with the old saying that “the poor evade and the rich avoid”, 
with people with higher income reducing their taxes through legal avoidance, while those 
with lower income evade more. 
Alm (2012) stresses the difficulty in analysing tax evasion due to the lack of reliable 
information on tax compliance, as taxpayers who evade have incentives to conceal their 
cheating, as tax evasion is an illegal practice. 
2.3 Tax Compliance 
One of tax compliance’s key issues is whether taxpayers have sufficient incentives to declare 
their income and pay taxes. There are two main lines of thought about this, one based on the 
economic theory, and the other one focusing on theories of psychology and sociology as 
factors that explain the level of tax compliance.  
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For Milliron and Toy (1988) the economic definition of tax compliance views taxpayers as 
perfectly moral, risk-neutral or risk-averse individuals who seek to maximise their utility, 
and choose to evade tax whenever the expected gain exceeds the cost. Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010) define tax compliance as the most inclusive and neutral term for taxpayers’ motivation 
to pay taxes. The intention of tax compliance can either be voluntary or enforced by 
authorities, leading to the honest payment of taxes. On the other hand, non-compliance refers 
to the act of paying less tax than it is due or outside the established deadlines, Roth et al. 
(1989). 
Alm (1991) found empirical evidence that if detection and punishment would be the only 
factors influencing taxpayer’s compliance behaviour, the overall compliance level would be 
lower than observed, which can only be explained by the existence of social and 
psychological factors affecting tax compliance.  
2.3.1 Economic Deterrence Models 
For a long time, taxpayers’ decisions were studied from an economic perspective with 
emphasis on economic deterrence models, which comprises the likelihood of being caught 
and the range of penalties charged to those who evade, as stated by Devos (2014). Economic 
sanctions were considered to be the key to obtain high levels of tax compliance.  
Hite (1989) stated that deterrence can be achieved by a persuasive approach, with the use of 
better education, increased advertising and incentives to improve taxpayers’ attitudes 
towards tax administration and honest tax reporting. On the other hand, Fischer et al. (1992) 
believe deterrence can be reached by increasing three important compliance behaviour 
drivers: 
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1. Tax rate, that  can be manipulated in order to increase tax compliance; 
2. Probability of detection, which refers to the probability that non-compliance will be 
discovered by the tax authorities; 
3. Penalty structure, with the imposition of tougher penalties to taxpayers who evade. 
Tittle and Logan (1973) found evidence that a high probability of apprehension was more 
relevant than the sanctions imposed itself, in opposition to Becker (1968), who believed that 
raising sanctions and reducing the probability of apprehension was a more effective tax 
decision. According to Jackson and Milliron (1986), the taxpayers’ perception of penalty 
levels are higher than the real ones, causing skewness in the research findings and making 
perceived rates of penalties more important than the actual penalties. 
In their studies related to the sensitivity of individuals towards risk of detection versus the 
magnitude of the penalty, applied to a group of several American university students, Jackson 
and Jones (1985) found evidence that with a small audit rate, taxpayers were more sensitive 
to the extent of a tax evasion penalty than to the probability of detection itself. However, 
Graetz and Wilde (1985) believed that this range of penalties increase alone was not the most 
effective measure, and governments should address the auditing levels and lower tax rates as 
a way to reduce non-compliance. Graetz et al. (1986) took into the equation not only the 
taxpayer, but also the IRS, considering it an important actor in the compliance study 
regarding the existing relationship with the taxpayer. They created a model with income 
levels, tax rates and fines as exogenous variables and following the natural sequence of 
decisions, where the taxpayer reports his income, with the IRS deciding whether or not to 
perform an audit. The decision of performing an audit will determine if the report defines his 
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final tax (in case the taxpayer is not audited) or if the tax liability is based on the true income 
plus any penalties or interest (in case of an audit). 
Despite studying the tax evasion from an economic perspective, Cowell (1985) stated that 
social objectives could be better achieved in others ways than penalties and audits, avoiding 
the loss of private expected utility. For that purpose, tax authorities should use the available 
information in a wise way in determining its tax policy.  
Cuccia (1994) considers economic-based compliance research useful to identify the motives 
behind taxpayers’ reports, but these models alone cannot predict accurately taxpayers’ 
reporting decisions due to different individual attitudes and biases. Analysing small groups 
of taxpayers with similar economic incentives is important to understand taxpayers’ 
behaviour. 
Hasseldine (2000) affirms that there is no unequivocal empirical evidence supporting the 
predictions of economic deterrence models, in line with Feld and Frey (2004) that believe 
the traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to explain successfully the 
extent of tax compliance. 
2.3.2 Social Psychology Models 
Lately, the focus of tax compliance studies was put in the social and psychological theories, 
focusing on psychological variables such as moral values and the perception of fairness of 
the tax system and tax authorities (Devos, 2014). Studies regarding both fiscal and social 
psychology analyse tax compliance from a human point of view, with several variables: 
social norms, education and personal characteristics to be considered important. 
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According to Pope and McKerchar (2011) the recent focus is on why taxpayers comply with 
their tax obligations instead of why they do not comply due to the higher than expected 
observed level of taxpayer compliance, in the traditional economic deterrence models. This 
unpredicted gap between expected and actual levels of tax compliance is generally associated 
with tax morals phenomenon and can be fulfilled with cooperation between taxpayers and 
fiscal authorities. This was previously referred by Andreoni et al. (1998), stating that social 
norms are a key factor for explaining the observed compliance levels, usually higher than the 
predicted by economic models. 
Schmölders (1959) was one of the first authors studying tax compliance from a mentality 
point of view, considering taxpayers’ self-interest distinct from the contribution to 
community interests. Comparing different countries across Europe, the author concluded that 
taxpayers’ attitudes are a reflection of cultural differences, experiences and mentalities. The 
author refers to taxes in the latin word (impuesto) as an imposition upon the citizens, opposite 
to the german word (steuer), where it is considered as a support, and in Scandinavia (skat), 
viewed as a common treasure destined for common purposes. 
Strümpel (1969) developed one of the first fiscal psychology models of tax compliance based 
on two main variables: 1) the rigidity of assessment, measuring the amount of taxes and the 
level of fines, the assessment process and the red tape in the engaging process with the tax 
authorities and 2) the willingness to cooperate related with the individuals’ attitudes and 
perception of the tax system.  
Later, Kinsey (1986) analysed the model developed by Strümpel (1969), interpreting 
willingness to cooperate as positively influencing tax compliance, contrary to the rigidity of 
assessment which appears to have two competing effects:  
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1. A positive effect on tax compliance under the influence of amount of fines, the tax 
rate and other economic variables; 
2. A negative one on the willingness to cooperate, involving the level of red tape in the 
engagement process with tax authority.  
Moreover, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) introduced an alternative to the previous fiscal 
psychology models, the Theory of Reasoned Action. According to this theory, taxpayers’ 
behaviour is determined by their intentions, which are a function of two factors: their attitudes 
towards behaviour and perception of subjective norms. The attitude towards behaviour is 
described as a positive or negative judgement regarding to the behaviour and the perception 
of subjective norms as the social pressure influencing a person to perform behaviour.  Lewis 
(1982) and Cialdini (1989) also used the TRA to study the psychology of taxation. The first 
one examined attitudes and perceptions of taxpayers in order to understand compliance 
behaviour finding several factors affecting evasion intentions: moral outlook, age, perception 
of others evasion and personal and demographic characteristics. The second used the model 
to address the possibility of improving compliance by educating taxpayers about their social 
responsibility of paying taxes. After, Ajzen (1991) introduced the Theory of Planed 
Behaviour, as an extension of the TRA, which became one of the most used social and 
psychological theories in tax compliance behaviour. The main evolution from the TPB was 
the introduction of the concept of perceived behavioural control as a key element in 
determining the intention to engage in target behaviour and influencing the performance of 
the behaviour. Marandu et al. (2015) draws attention to the fact that TPB can fail to capture 
all the significant behaviour determinants of tax compliance because it is a general theory, 
not specific to analyse tax compliance behaviour. 
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Smith and Kinsey (1978) had a different approach in order to understand taxpayer behaviour. 
Rather than taxpayer intentions determining behaviour, they believe that situational factors 
as available information, opportunities for taking actions and the difficulty and costs of those 
actions, dictate taxpayers’ compliance decision and actions. For the authors, the taxpayer 
behaviour results from indifference or habit rather than purely their intention. 
Alm et al. (1992) also conducted a series of laboratory experiments in order to examine the 
role of fiscal exchange and the use of tax revenues and the decision process, finding that 
taxpayers respond positively when tax proceeds are applied in programs they approve and 
when they feel they are active in the decision process. Büttner and Grimm (2016) affirm that 
a government that is able to implement transparent policies, avoiding high levels of 
corruption, is a crucial requirement for high levels of tax compliance. 
2.4 Tax Morals 
Devos (2014) affirms that tax morals is related to taxpayers’ beliefs and norms in relation to 
their tax obligations and is linked to the term tax ethics. OECD (2013) describes it as the 
taxpayers’ motivation to pay their taxes other than their legal obligation to do so. Another 
definition is given by Alm and Torgler (2006) describing tax morals as the individual’s 
intrinsic willingness to pay taxes, which according to Torgler (2011) is an important 
determinant of the “shadow economy”, having an impact on tax evasion. The concept of 
“shadow economy” is described by Schneider (2011) as the unregistered economic activities 
that escape detection of tax authorities. 
Schwartz and Orleans (1967) were pioneer in the studies of tax morals with a field experiment 
to determine the effectiveness of sanction, compared with an appeal to conscience in 
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increasing normative sentiments about the compliance in the income taxes payment. They 
concluded that sanctions were more effective on the highest social classes of the population, 
by opposition to the least educated, who are more sensitive to the appeals to conscience on 
their attitudes towards tax compliance. Even more important, they found evidence that 
conscience appeals are more effective than sanction threats regarding the overall tax 
compliance. 
Tax morals have been broadly studied with several authors, as Torgler et al. (2008) and 
OECD (2013), pointing a direct relationship between tax morals and tax compliance 
behaviour, suggesting that taxpayers with high tax morals are more likely to comply, whereas 
those with low tax morals are more likely not to do so. According to the literature, the 
correlation between tax moral and tax compliance cuts across both developing and developed 
countries, making it important to understand what drives differences in tax morals across 
countries, to understand differences in tax compliance. Frey (1997) is one of the authors 
affirming that the intrinsic motivation for individuals to pay taxes differs across countries 
and if taxpayer values are influenced by cultural norms, with different societal institutions 
acting as constraints and varying between different countries, tax morals can be an important 
cause of taxpayer compliance and tax behaviour. 
Torgler (2003) and Torgler and Murphy (2004) conducted important studies concluding that 
high levels of trust in the government and a high sense of moral obligation linked to the 
religion have a positive effect on tax morals. Cummings et al. (2009) also argue that the 
quality of governance and therefore the individual’s positive perception of their governments 
induces higher tax compliance. 
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2.5 Tax Ethics 
Alm and Torgler (2011) believe that ethics play a significant role in explaining tax 
compliance decisions and the differences in the ethics across different individuals that 
contribute to explain those decisions. Wenzel (2007) describes taxpayer ethics as a sense of 
moral obligation to pay taxes that affect tax compliance. 
McGee (1998) describes four major views on the ethics of tax evasion which have appeared 
over time: 
1. Tax evasion is never ethical, as individuals have a moral duty with the state to pay 
whatever taxes are demanded. This is a very criticized view and McGee (1999) 
points that not all taxes are automatically fair from an ethical perspective, with one 
of the most used examples being the Jews who had the moral obligation to pay tax 
during the Nazi regime; 
2. Tax evasion is always ethical, which assumes the position that all governments are 
illegitimate; 
3. Tax evasion is sometimes ethical, being largely discussed if individuals should pay 
for services they do not want, need, or use, or if they have an ethical obligation to 
pay more than what they receive in benefits;  
4. There is an affirmative duty to evade taxes, making tax evasion one way of resisting 
to evil governments and wars, among others.  
The lack of tax ethics is described by Song and Yarbrough (1978) as a disease seriously 
threatening the moral fiber of society and the reliability of the democratic system. The authors 
found that the degree of tax ethics is related to the level of suspicion that others violate the 
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tax laws, as the ones with higher tax ethics believe that others comply with tax authorities 
and the ones with less tax ethics believe the other are non-compliant.  
2.5.1 Religion on Tax Ethics 
Despite the idea stressed by Tomes (1985) that economics is fundamentally atheistic, and 
religious beliefs, practices and behaviour play no role in the life of “homo economicus”, one 
of the historical reasons found in tax literature to justify why people pay taxes is a sense of 
moral and religious obligation (Benk et al., 2015). 
Grasmick et al. (1991) found evidence that the religious identity highlights the threat of 
shame as a sanction, and therefore inhibits illegal behaviour like tax cheating. Torgler and 
Murphy (2004) studied the possibility that religiosity was a restriction to engage in tax 
evasion due to existing empirical studies that concluded that countries with higher rates of 
religious membership had significantly lower crime. They found evidence that, as more 
religious people are, the higher their level of tax morals. Torgler (2006) also analysed 
religiosity as a factor that potentially affects tax morals as an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. 
Analysing several variables such as religious education, perceived religiosity, church 
attendance and trust in the church, among other, the study’s results pointed to the fact that 
religiosity raises tax morals.  
Stack and Kposowa (2006) state that low rates of deviant behaviour, as tax fraud, can be 
consequence of high levels of religiosity in a society and point to the importance of religion 
in determining cultural attitudes on tax evasion unacceptability. 
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2.5.2 Age on Tax Ethics 
Age is a frequently demographic variable examined in social sciences studies, according to 
McGee (1998). In particular, the author states that older people tend to be more ethical than 
younger people and obey more to rules and laws. An early study from Tittle (1980), regarding 
this topic, suggests that younger taxpayers are more willing to take risks than older people, 
and are less sensitive to sanctions, due to lifecycle variations and generational differences. In 
line with this perception, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) refer that the majority of the studies 
examining the age variable conclude that older people are more tax compliant. McGee et al. 
(2001) and Gupta and McGee (2010) are also among the authors who found older people to 
be more opposed to tax evasion than younger ones. According to Braithwaite et al. (2006), 
this happens because older generations seem to be better socialized into taxpaying and 
younger generations still need to go through a long life experience and socialization process 
regarding taxpaying. They state that younger people are less compliant in attitude and 
behaviour than older people and they are less likely to be tax compliant than middle aged and 
older. Torgler and Valev (2006) add the idea that age has been determined as an important 
element for illegal activities, as older people seem to be on average more tax compliant and 
less likely to get involved in criminal activities. 
However there are studies with different conclusions regarding the influence of age on tax 
ethics. Clotfelter (1983) found evidence that both younger and older taxpayers have the 
highest degree of compliance, by opposition to the middle aged population. Porcano (1998) 
didn’t found a consistent relationship between age and tax evasion suggesting that this 
demographic variable does not significantly influence tax evasion.  
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2.5.3 Gender on Tax Ethics 
According to McGee (1998), gender is most likely the demographic variable more frequently 
studied in the social sciences literature. For example, Jackson and Milliron (1986) affirm that 
the majority of studies regarding the compliance level of males versus females have found 
men to be less compliant than women. Betz et al. (1989) also reported in their studies that 
men are more likely to engage in unethical business behaviour than women. Kastlunger et al. 
(2010) also concluded that men were less tax compliant, and also more likely to act 
strategically when paying their taxes. This could be explained mainly by the differences in 
socialization, femininity traits and self-image, with females being more socially than 
biologically determined. 
On the other hand, Hasseldine and Hite (2003) found no evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences 
between men and women in their tax reporting characteristics. The results of their study 
suggested that women are more compliant in response to a positive fiscal policy 
communication by opposition to men who appear to respond better to negative persuasive 
communication. Overall, it looks like the gap between females and males is showing a 
tightening tendency, with the increasing new generation of working women and a greater 
sense of independency (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). 
2.5.4 Education Level on Tax Ethics 
The connection between education and tax compliance is quite difficult to understand, 
according to most of the literature. Beron et al. (1988) affirm that the education is highly 
correlated with income, and therefore its influence on tax compliance interpretation is not 
straightforward. Smith (1992) examined the relation between the education level and the 
perceptions of the probability of detection, stating that higher educated taxpayers present 
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lower perceived threat of sanctions. Also, Kasipillai et al. (2003) found statistical evidence 
suggesting a positive relationship between the level of education and tax compliance. 
Kolodziej (2011) highlights the role of economic education in creating positive attitudes of 
taxpayers towards tax law and authorities. More so, McGee (1998) discussed that more 
educated taxpayers tend to be more tax compliant and have more respect towards the law. 
However these groups usually have higher income levels and are therefore highly taxed, 
which, on the other hand, can result in higher evasion tendency.  
2.5.5 Occupation on Tax Ethics 
According to Hashimzade et al. (2014), the main importance of occupation on tax ethics is 
the possibility of concealing income in different occupations. The income tax directly 
deducted from the employees’ salaries prevents any chance to evade, while self-employed 
have the opportunity to underreport and hide their income. The tradition of cash payments, 
depending on the nature of the occupation, can also influence tax compliance and ethics. 
Several studies, as Porcano (1998), have found that withholding of income at source or third-
party information reporting was the most relevant variable in explaining non-compliant 
behaviour. In case of the banking industry, Koslowski (2011) points that the financial crisis 
highlighted the existence of a crisis no the ethical aspects of financial institutions and 
markets.   
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3 Hypotheses 
The main goal of this dissertation is to answer to the following research questions “The 
attitudes of banking employees on the ethics of tax evasion and their beliefs towards tax 
compliance are in line with the past literature findings?” and “Do banking employees present 
high levels of tax ethics?”, exploring the previous work by McGee (2006). Consequently, 
based on the main variables affecting tax compliance, studied on the literature review, a series 
of hypotheses were defined and chosen to be tested. In order to test the hypotheses there were 
performed statistical tests with a 5% level of significance. Hopefully, they will contribute to 
a better understanding of the ethics role in taxpayers’ behaviour, as part of their tax 
compliance decisions. 
H1-14: For each argument favouring tax evasion, the respondents show a high level of ethics 
towards tax evasion 
H15: Taxpayers with high religiosity levels are more likely to be ethical in their attitudes 
towards tax evasion  
Torgler and Murphy (2004) and Torgler (2006) were among the authors investigating 
religiosity as a restriction to engage in tax evasion, concluding that more religious people 
present higher levels of tax morals, having more positive attitudes towards paying taxes. 
H16: Older people tend to be more ethical than younger people in their attitudes towards tax 
evasion 
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This hypothesis is supported by the literature review, with several authors finding evidences 
that younger taxpayers are less compliant with their tax obligations, including Richardson 
and Sawyer (2001), McGee et al. (2001) and Gupta and McGee (2010). 
H17: Women are more ethical than men in their attitudes towards tax evasion 
Several authors that studied gender as a variable influencing tax compliance, found men to 
be less compliant than women, as Tittle (1980), Betz et al. (1989) and Kastlunger et al. 
(2010). However, authors like Hasseldine and Hite (2003), claim that there are no significant 
differences between men and women in tax reporting characteristics.   
As such, this hypothesis is formulated in line with the majority of past research findings. 
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4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Methodology  
Analysing tax evasion is a difficult task, as Alm (2012) affirms due to the lack of reliable 
information on taxpayer compliance. One common way to study this topic is the use of 
surveys to assess taxpayers’ attitudes towards tax evasion. As according to Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010), surveys on tax compliance are one of the most used methods to analyse tax 
compliance levels. Based on past literature, this dissertation makes use of a survey applied 
to banking employees as a tool to try to assess their attitudes on the ethics of tax evasion. 
Crowe (1944) was pioneer on studying tax evasion from an ethical perspective, presenting 
15 arguments favouring tax evasion and discussing the moral obligation of paying taxes from 
a theological and philosophical perspective, and according to the major views on the ethics 
of tax evasion, previously described in the literature review. Years later this work was 
revisited and developed in several works, by McGee (2006; 2014), with an upgraded 18-
statement survey to assess the participants’ opinions on tax evasion. These works were the 
starting point for the survey that is presented in this thesis. 
Another useful work, when studying this topic, is the World Values Survey, a global research 
project, representative of almost 100 countries, which studies people’s values and beliefs, 
and provides a global picture of tax morals. It consists of a number of key questions that were 
taken into account in the realization of the survey. 
It is important, however, to have in mind what Alm (2012) referred, as the data obtained 
through questionnaires is somehow suspicious, given that taxpayers may not answer in a 
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completely honest way. Furthermore, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) discuss that the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviour is not upfront as sometimes people act differently than their 
beliefs, due to external circumstances. 
The present work consists on a survey, administered to banking employees from the 
headquarters of bank institution operating in Portugal. The data was collected through 
internal communication, during June and July of 2016, ensuring the participants data 
confidentiality, in order to try to guarantee the most honest answers possible. The sample 
consists of a total of 71 valid observations, 50 males and 21 females, aging between 20 and 
58 years of age. The analysis of the data was carried out using Microsoft Excel and SPSS 
Statistics V23. 
The survey was constructed considering all the aspects mentioned above, and is divided into 
the following sections: 
Part A - Tax Compliance - This part consists of some statements about tax compliance, with 
respect to the shadow economy problem, in particular the non-declared “cash in hand 
“payments. It also includes one open-ended question, where the participants are requested to 
make a comment on the sentence “It is unfair to make cash payments in order to avoid taxes”. 
Part B - Tax Evasion - The participants are presented a series of sentences to give their 
opinion about the extent of the tax evasion problem and the consequences to those who are 
caught evading taxes.  
Part C - Tax Ethics and Tax Morals - In this part, two important questions are given to 
quantify the attitudes toward tax evasion and tax morals levels. Also, a series of arguments 
that justify or not tax evasion are presented in 14 statements, where participants are asked 
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“Tax evasion is ethical if …”, using a 5 point Likert scale, ranging between 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree.  
Part D - Socio-Demographic Data - Here there are asked a series of questions to identify 
important social variables as age, gender, education. There are, furthermore, several 
questions to identify religious variables. 
The first test that is important to perform, when using multiple Likert questions in a survey 
is a reliability analysis, to measure the internal consistency of the questions. For that purpose 
Cronbach's alpha is commonly used. 
In order to test the hypotheses H1-14, a one sample t-Student test statistic was executed. 
These statistical tests were performed with a 5% level of significance, and the collected 
answers are assumed to be normally distributed. As the sample size is larger than 30 
observations, we can consider the central limit theorem to approximate the sample to a 
normal distribution. 
Regarding the hypotheses H15-17, non-parametric tests were used to compare differences 
between two independent groups, more specifically the Mann-Whitney test. Due to the fact 
that some groups in study have a sample size lower than 30 observations, the use of non-
parametric tests is more adequate, as there is no assumption about the probability 
distributions of the variables evaluated.  
Regarding the factor analysis, two important examinations that can be performed are the 
cluster analysis and a principal component analysis. The first one is an explorative analysis 
that attempts to identify homogenous groups of respondents within the sample, with respect 
to one or more characteristics, according to Marôco (2010). As for the second, the author 
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defines it as variable-reduction technique that allows us to transform a set of similar variables 
into a smaller number grouping them into dimensions, called principal components. This 
process should occur without significant loss of information. The link between the cluster 
analysis and the principal component analysis enable to clustering with a small number of 
input variables, which are the principal components. This is an important addition to the 
hypotheses testing, as it gives us the possibility to look into the behaviour of groups with 
similar characteristics in the sample and reducing the number of variables in their analysis. 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Variables 
The variables selected in the study are age, gender, religiosity and tax ethics. The survey 
includes a series of questions to identify and measure these variables which will be examined 
next. 
1. Age 
In terms of age we observed participants aging between 20 and 58 years of age, with an 
average of 39.49 years. In order to analyse the results from the age point of view, the sample 
was divided in 2 groups: the first is composed by respondents up to 40 years old, while the 
other with the ones aging more than 40 years. From the observed sample, 35 participants 
belonged to the younger group and 36 to the older group. 
2. Gender 
Regarding to gender, the majority of the respondents were male, with 50 observations 
(29.6%) and 21 females (70.4%). 
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3. Religiosity 
With respect to the religion the participants were asked the question “Currently, do you feel 
you belong to any particular religion?”, with 43 participants affirming to belong to a religion, 
against 29 claiming not to belong to any religion. The ones who currently don’t belong to 
any religion were asked “Have you ever felt you belonged to any particular religion?”, with 
20 claiming never felt to belong to any religion and 9 who did.  
In order to analyse this variable, points were awarded to que questions regarding the 
frequency of religious services attendance and praying, using a 6 point scale ranging between 
1 = daily and 6 = never. The respondents scoring a total up to 6 points were included in the 
religious group, while to ones with a score higher than 6 points were considered non-
religious. 
Table 1 - Responses by religion 
 Frequency Percent 
Religious  21 29,6 
Non-religious 50 70,4 
Total 71 100,0 
 
Table 2 - Religious services attendance and praying frequency 
 Religious services attendance Praying frequency 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Weekly 13 18,3 17 23,9 
Monthly 4 5,6 7 9,9 
Yearly 4 5,6 3 4,2 
Occasionally 26 36,6 17 23,9 
Never 24 33,8 27 38,0 
Total 71 100,0 71 100,0 
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4. Tax Ethics 
In order to assess the tax ethics level, a series of arguments that justify or don’t tax evasion 
were presented in 14 statements, similar to the ones used in McGee (2006; 2014) studies, 
where participants were asked: “Tax evasion is ethical if …”.  A 5 point Likert scale was 
used, ranging between 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. The lower the score the 
more opposed the respondents were to the argument justifying evading taxes. The average 
score to each argument can be found in the table 10 (see appendix). 
To perform the hypotheses test, if the respondents present a high level of ethics for each 
argument favouring tax evasion, the population mean was considered to be an average score 
of 2 points, meaning that the respondents strongly disagree or at least disagree with the 
argument. The choice of setting the null hypothesis equal to 2 is related with the Likert scale 
used, as that answer consists on disagreeing with the affirmation. Thus, we are testing the 
hypothesis that the participants, on average disagree with the argument justifying tax evasion 
and therefore present a high level of ethics towards tax evasion.  
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5 Results 
It is interesting to start by analysing the answers to the open-ended question, where the 
participants were requested to quantify their degree of agreement and make a comment on 
the sentence “It is unfair to make cash payments in order to avoid taxes”. The vast majority 
of the respondents show their concordance (only 4 disagree or strongly disagree) with the 
argument and the widespread opinion is that the use of cash payments in order to avoid taxes 
represents a major problem regarding the “shadow economy” phenomenon, and are therefore 
one of the leading causes of heavier tax burden. 
Concerning the tax evasion issue, 90% of the survey respondents consider it to be a major 
problem and 82% believe tax evasion to be a very or moderately widespread phenomenon, 
which leads us to conclude that the general opinion is that this is a serious problem. Regarding 
the probability of those who evade taxes being caught, the opinion differs widely with 50% 
thinking that it is likely to happen and 44% that it is unlikely. The vast majority of the 
participants (76%) consider tax evasion to always be unacceptable. 
The reliability analysis for the 14 items shows a Cronbach's alpha of  0.909, indicating a very 
high level of internal consistency for our scale on the tax ethics questions. 
5.1 Hypotheses tests 
Analysing the answer to each statement, we verify that in 8 of them the null hypothesis is not 
rejected (H1, H4, H5, H6, H7, H10, H12 and H13), meaning that the average mean is around 
2 and for those affirmations the respondents disagree that tax evasion is ethical in those 
situations. In the cases where the null hypothesis is rejected we observe an average mean 
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lower than 2 for most situations, which means that there is a strong sense of ethics regarding 
the affirmations from those hypothesis (H3, H8, H9, H11 and H14). Thus, the only argument 
where there is no high levels of ethics on tax evasion is when a large portion of the money 
collected is wasted (H2). We can affirm that there is evidence of high levels of ethics towards 
tax evasion, which is one of the most important finding, as one of the research questions was 
“Do banking employees present high levels of tax ethics?”. 
Table 3 - Hypotheses tests - Attitudes toward tax evasion for the whole sample 
Hypothesis 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Mean  t p-value 
Mean 
Difference 
Conclusion 
H1 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 2,18 1,032 ,306 ,141 Not Reject H0 
H2 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 2,50 2,995 ,004 ,465 Reject H0 
H3 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,74 -2,176 ,033 -,254 Reject H0 
H4 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 2,19 1,197 ,235 ,155 Not Reject H0 
H5 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,93 -,410 ,683 -,056 Not Reject H0 
H6 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,97 -,591 ,557 -,070 Not Reject H0 
H7 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,85 -1,715 ,091 -,183 Not Reject H0 
H8 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,76 -2,599 ,011 -,282 Reject H0 
H9 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,63 -4,750 ,000 -,423 Reject H0 
H10 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 2,19 1,259 ,212 ,155 Not Reject H0 
H11 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,64 -4,724 ,000 -,408 Reject H0 
H12 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 2,06 ,099 ,922 ,014 Not Reject H0 
H13 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,93 -,956 ,343 -,113 Not Reject H0 
H14 H0: µ2 H1: µ≠2 1,63 -4,058 ,000 -,366 Reject H0 
 
Also, to improve the robustness of this examination, we performed 4 extra tests with the null 
hypotheses set for the population means of 1, 1.5, 2.5 and 3 (see appendix). 
We can see that for the extreme points, which are 1, the minimum Likert scale point, where 
respondents strongly agree with the argument, and 3, the Likert scale indifference point, all 
the hypothesis were rejected so we can conclude that the average score for every argument 
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is between 1 and 3. For the 2.5 test, the results are quite similar to the test for the mean of 2, 
with the argument there is when a large portion of the money collected is wasted (H2), being 
the only one above the average mean, with no high levels of ethics on tax evasion. These 
extra examination also supports the evidence of high levels of ethics towards tax evasion for 
the banking employee’s population. 
Regarding the hypothesis that taxpayers with high religiosity levels are more likely to be 
ethical in their attitudes towards tax evasion (H15), we defined the null hypothesis that 
religious and non-religious groups have equal levels of tax ethics. Performing the Mann-
Whitney test, we observe that for every argument regarding the ethics on tax evasion the p-
value is higher than the significance level of 0.05, so the decision is not to reject the null 
significantly for each of the 14 arguments and there is no evidence to conclude that the levels 
of tax ethics are different between the two groups, as seen in table 11 (see appendix). 
As for the assumption that older people tend to be more ethical than younger people in their 
attitudes towards tax evasion (H16), the null hypothesis consists on the younger group having 
equal levels of tax ethics than the older group. Analysing the results from the Mann-Whitney 
test, we observe that the test statistic is in the rejection region and the p-value is lower than 
the significance level of 0.05, so we decided not to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that 
the differences between both groups in each argument, are not statistically significantly. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of older people presenting higher levels of tax ethics than 
younger people, as shown in table 12 (see appendix). 
Looking at the hypothesis that women are more ethical than men in their attitudes towards 
tax evasion (H17), we defined the null hypothesis that women and man have equal levels of 
tax ethics. Performing a Mann-Whitney test, we observed that p-value is higher than the 
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significance level of 0.05 for every argument regarding ethics on tax evasion, so the decision 
is not to reject the null hypothesis. Then, there is no evidence to conclude that women present 
higher levels of ethics than men, revealing no differences in level of ethics towards tax 
evasion in the sample, as presented in table 13 (see appendix). 
5.2 Factor Analysis 
In order to determine the numbers of clusters in the sample it was performed a hierarchical 
cluster method, using a graphical representation of the agglomeration coefficients, as can be 
seen in the figure 2 (see appendix). The observation of this graphic suggests a 4 cluster 
solution as the most appropriate.  
Before taking the principal component analysis we should assess the existence of significant 
outliers in the sample in study. By the observation of the figure 3 (see appendix), we can 
conclude that none of the affirmations regarding the ethics on tax evasion should be excluded 
from the analysis. When performing the principal component analysis a set of results analysis 
should be taken into consideration, where several items are verified: 
 The KMO measure of sampling adequacy allows us to understand if it is adequate to 
summarize the information provided by the initial affirmations into a lower number of 
factors. In this particular case we have a good adequacy level with a KMO of 0.835. 
Table 4 - KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,835 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 663,335 
Df 91 
Sig. ,000 
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 The Communalities are the proportion of each variable's variance that can be explained 
by the principal components. We observe in the table 18 (see appendix) that every 
argument presents a higher level of communality than 0.3. 
 The total variance explained by the 2 extracted principal components accounts for 
60.774% of the total variance, which is an adequate value. 
Table 5 - Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Total % of Variance Total % of Variance 
1 6,875 49,111 6,875 49,111 5,046 36,044 
2 1,633 11,664 1,633 11,664 3,462 24,730 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the principal component analysis is adequate and the rotated 
component matrix presents 2 principal components found grouped by the arguments on ethics 
of tax evasion that characterise them. One possible characterization of the 2 principal 
components is “Paying taxes is a duty” for the first one, and “Moral reasons to not paying 
taxes” for the second. 
Table 6 - Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Component 
(1) Paying taxes is a 
duty 
(2) Moral reasons 
to not paying 
taxes 
Even if most of the money collected is spent wisely ,922 ,049 
If a large portion of the money collected is spent on 
projects that do not benefit me 
,863 ,179 
Even if a large portion of the money collected is 
spent on worthy projects 
,849 ,200 
Even if a large portion of the money collected is 
spent on projects that do benefit me 
,812 ,258 
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Even if it means that if I pay less, others will have to 
pay more 
,718 ,388 
If the probability of getting caught is low ,675 ,414 
If everyone is doing it ,597 ,285 
If I was sure I would never get caught ,590 ,487 
If a large portion of the money collected is spent on 
projects that I morally disapprove of 
,285 ,734 
If I lived in Portugal during the Salazar regime ,047 ,700 
If I can’t afford to pay ,167 ,668 
If the government discriminates against me because 
of my religion, race or ethnic background 
,158 ,665 
Even if tax rates are not too high because the 
government is not entitled to take as much as it is 
taking from me 
,375 ,624 
If a large portion of the money collected is wasted ,345 ,610 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
  
  
With the principal component analysis, we can proceed again to the sample clustering with 
the K-means algorithm, through which the 4 cluster solution is validated. 
Table 7 - ANOVA 
 
Cluster Error 
F Sig. Mean Square df Mean Square df 
Paying taxes is a duty 17,806 3 ,247 67 71,948 ,000 
Moral reasons to not paying taxes 17,461 3 ,263 67 66,404 ,000 
 
Finally we can analyse our 4 clusters and their representativity in the 2 defined principal 
components. 
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Table 8 - Cluster Distribution  
 
Female 
To 40 
years 
Female 
+ 40 
years 
Male 
To 40 
years 
Male 
+ 40 
years 
Cluster 
Number 
of Case 
Cluster 1 % 75,0% 25,0% 43,8% 56,3% 
Cluster 2 % 0,0% 100,0% 53,3% 46,7% 
Cluster 3 % 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
Cluster 4 % 66,7% 33,3% 38,9% 61,1% 
Total % 57,1% 42,9% 46,0% 54,0% 
 
 Table 9 - Cluster Description 
 
Paying taxes is a duty Moral reasons to not paying taxes 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
Cluster 1 ,857 ,619 ,230 ,594 
Cluster 2 -,521 ,613 1,069 ,506 
Cluster 3 2,428 ,310 -1,651 ,619 
Cluster 4 -,726 ,137 -,914 ,411 
  
We can also conclude from figure 1 that the participants grouped in the cluster 3 are the ones 
who agree more with the affirmations regarding the principal component “Paying taxes is a 
duty” and less with “Moral reasons to not paying taxes. It is also relevant that the respondents 
from cluster 1 have a contrary and symmetrical to the opinions from the cluster 4. 
Figure 1 - Factor Analysis 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Main Conclusions 
The study’s main objective was to assess the attitudes of banking employees on the ethics of 
tax evasion. Analysing the survey results, the majority of the respondents showed a strong 
opposition to tax evasion, disagreeing with the arguments favouring tax evasion. So, the 
results point to the existence of high tax ethics levels on banking employees.  
Contrary to expectations, and most of the literature, women did not present higher levels of 
tax ethics than men, with evidences suggesting the ethics levels to be similar. This can be 
justified by the increasing new generation of working women and their higher independency, 
as argued by Richardson and Sawyer (2001). Also, the religiosity level was not a determinant 
factor from the tax ethics level, with no evidence found that the ethics towards tax evasion 
was different between religious and non-religious people. The study also didn’t found any 
significant differences between different age groups, suggesting that this demographic 
variable does not significantly influence tax evasion, as stated by Porcano (1998). 
The factor analysis indicates 2 principal components, designated by “Paying taxes is a duty” 
and “Moral reasons to not paying taxes”, and grouped the participants in 4 clusters. 
Hopefully, this work will draw interest into this topic, leading to new studies and contributing 
to further research in the tax ethics analysis. 
6.2 Limitations 
Despite the fact that surveys on taxpayer attitudes has much less limitations than on 
individuals’ compliance decisions, according to Alm and Torgler (2011), there are some 
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objections that can be made to the use of surveys to assess this issue. Jackson & Milliron 
(1986) suggest that one of the main problems related with surveys is the obtainment of honest 
answers due to the sensitive nature of this kind of information. Also, Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980) emphasize that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour are not 
straightforward, as it’s not unusual that people behave differently from their beliefs. Another 
critical factor of using surveys in this work is the possibility of the sample not being 
representative of the banking employees’ population. 
6.3 Further Research 
This kind of research on tax ethics has endless possibilities. It would be interesting to extend 
this survey at a national level with assess to employees of the biggest bank institutions 
operating in Portugal, having a more representative sample. Even in the bank institution 
studied, it would be valuable to extend the study to all national territory rather than just in 
Lisbon and Porto, which was not possible due to some restrictions. 
Another possibility would be to compare the results obtained with different population 
samples other than banking employees, observing the divergences or agreements on their 
attitudes on tax ethics.  
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8 Appendixes 
8.1 Survey 
The distribution of the questionnaire was carried out in a Portuguese version. 
 
This survey aims to study ethical attitudes in tax evasion and fraud in personal income tax, thus it should be answered by the 
Bank employees. It’s part of a project from the Master in Finance, which has been developed in Instituto Superior de Economia  
e Gestão (ISEG), Universidade de Lisboa (UL). 
We ask you to pay attention to the answer’s instructions that will appear along the survey.  
We remind you that there are no right or wrong answers. All of them are important. 
This survey is anonymous and thus we guarantee the data confidentiality. The answers will be treated only in aggregate form, 
therefore is not allowed the individual identification. 
We thank you for your collaboration that is crucial for this project.  
 
A. You are now going to see a series of statements that people have made about complying with tax obligat ions. The statements 
are about the shadow economy, in which income is received in cash and not declared for tax purposes. For each statement, plea se 
select if you (SA) “strongly agree”, (A) “agree”, (N) “neutral”, (D) “disagree” or (SD) “strongly disagree” . 
A1. Please consider to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
  SA A N D SD 
1 It is unfair to use cash to avoid paying tax • • • • • 
2 
Through various communications, the Autoridade Tributária (AT) is keeping the community informed 
about their efforts to stop 'cash in hand payments' 
• • • • • 
3 The AT is effective in dealing with people who do not declare all their cash earnings • • • • • 
4 I do not think it is fair for people to consistently work for cash in hand payments without paying tax • • • • • 
5 
In the last 12 months, I have heard what happens to people who have not complied with their tax 
obligations 
• • • • • 
 
A2. Please try to explain, in as much detail as you can, your answer to the question “It is unfair to use cash to avoid paying taxes” 
 
B. Tax evasion consists of licit acts or businesses that are qualified by tax law as not being in accordance with the economic reality 
or as being abusive. Therefore, tax evasion is considered as a deliberate practice, not an accidental one. 
 
B1. In your view, do you think that income tax evasion is… 
1 A major problem • 
2 A moderate problem • 
3 A minor problem • 
4 Not a problem at all • 
5 Don't know • 
 
B2. In your view, how widespread do you think income tax evasion is… 
1 Very widespread • 
2 Fairly widespread • 
3 Not very widespread • 
4 Not widespread at all • 
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5 Don't know • 
 
B3. In your view, do you think AT is currently putting too much, too little or about the right amount of effort into reducing income 
tax evasion? 
1 Too much • 
2 Too little • 
3 No effort • 
4 About the right amount • 
5 Don't know • 
 
B4. How likely would you say it is for people who regularly evade paying income tax to get caught? 
 
1 Very likely • 
2 Quite likely • 
3 Not likely • 
4 Not at all likely • 
5 Don't know • 
 
B5. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. For each statement, please select if you (SA) 
“strongly agree”, (A) “agree”, (N) ”neutral”, (D) “disagree” or (SD) “strongly disagree”. 
  SA A N D SD 
1 A lot of people I know think its okay not to pay tax on cash earnings • • • • • 
2 I think it’s okay being paid in cash for a job and then not declaring all of it on your tax return  • • • • • 
3 The financial penalties AT can impose are sufficient to deter people from regularly evading income tax? • • • • • 
 
B6. What are the possible consequences for people caught evading income tax, especially where it becomes public knowledge? 
(Code all that apply) 
1 Social stigma • 
2 Embarrassment • 
3 Negative impact on job prospects • 
4 Negative impact on credit record • 
5 Negative impact on ability to start up in business • 
6 Financial penalties • 
7 Financial problems • 
8 Criminal record • 
9 Prison sentence • 
10 No consequences • 
11 Other ___________________ • 
12 Don't know/ Can't think of any • 
 
B7. Please consider which of the statements comes closest to your own view about income tax evasion.  
1 It is always acceptable (Continue to D1) • 
2 It is mostly acceptable (but depends on the circumstances) • 
3 It is mostly unacceptable (but depends on the circumstances) (Continue to C9) •  
4 It is always unacceptable (Continue to D1) • 
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5 None of these (Continue to D1) • 
6 Don't know (Continue to D1) • 
 
B8. In which are the circumstances do you think income tax evasion would be acceptable? (Code all that apply) 
1 When a person cannot afford to pay tax/financial hardship •  
2 When small amounts of money are involved •  
3 When the evasion activity is short term/a one off •  
4 Depends on a person’s occupation • 
5 When taxes are unfair or unreasonable •  
6 When a person is disadvantaged or vulnerable (e.g. elderly or disabled) •  
7 Other ____________ •  
 
B9. In which circumstances do you think income tax evasion would be unacceptable? (Code all that apply) 
1 When a person can afford to pay tax/is wealthy • 
2 When the amount of money is large • 
3 When the evasion activity is long term/regular • 
4 Depends on a person’s occupation • 
5 Depends on the type of evasion • 
6 Other ____________ • 
 
B10. Which is the main reason taxpayers wouldn’t regularly evade income tax? (Choose only one option).  
1 The probability/likelihood of being caught • 
2 Because it is immoral • 
3 Because they're honest • 
4 Because it's illegal • 
5 Because it is unfair to other taxpayers • 
6 There is no reason why not to regularly evade tax • 
7 Because of the penalties/consequences they could face • 
9 Other ____________ • 
 
C. This section aims to assess tax morale and tax ethics levels in relation to tax evasion. 
 
C1. Please consider to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. For each statement, please select if you 
(SA) “strongly agree”, (A) “agree”, (N) ”neutral”, (D) “disagree” or (SD) “strongly disagree”. 
 
  SA A N D SD 
1 It is always justifiable to claim government benefits to which you’re not entitled to  • • • • • 
2 It is always justifiable cheating on taxes if you have a chance • • • • • 
 
 
 
 
C2. Please consider to what extent you agree or disagree, about each statement, as a way of governing a country. For each statement, 
please select if you (SA) “strongly agree”, (A) “agree”, (N) ”neutral”, (D) “disagree” or (SD) “strongly disagree”. 
  SA A N D SD 
1 Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections • • • • • 
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2 Having a democratic political system • • • • • 
 
C3. Please consider your degree of trust in the following institutions. For each institution, please select  if you (TT) “totally trust”, 
(T) “trust”, (N) “neutral”, (D) “distrust” or (TD) “totally distrust”. 
  TT T N D TD 
1 The Police • • • • • 
2 The Courts • • • • • 
3 The Government (in your nation’s capital) • • • • • 
4 Political Parties • • • • • 
5 Parliament • • • • • 
6 The President • • • • • 
 
C4. Please consider to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. For each statement, please select if you 
(SA) “strongly agree”, (A) “agree”, (N) ”neutral”, (D) “disagree” or (SD) “strongly disagree”. 
 
 
  SA A N D SD 
1 
Tax evasion is ethical even if tax rates are not too high because the government is not entitled to take as 
much as it is taking from me. 
• • • • • 
2 Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is wasted. • • • • • 
3 Tax evasion is ethical even if most of the money collected is spent wisely. • • • • • 
4 
Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that I morally 
disapprove of. 
• • • • • 
5 Tax evasion is ethical even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on worthy projects. • • • • • 
6 
Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that do not benefit 
me. 
• • • • • 
7 
Tax evasion is ethical even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that do benefit 
me. 
• • • • • 
8 Tax evasion is ethical if everyone is doing it. • • • • • 
9 Tax evasion is ethical if the probability of getting caught is low. • • • • • 
10 Tax evasion is ethical if I can’t afford to pay. • • • • • 
11 Tax evasion is ethical even if it means that if I pay less, others will have to pay more.  • • • • • 
12 
Tax evasion is ethical if the government discriminates against me because of my religion, race or ethnic 
background. 
• • • • • 
13 Tax evasion would be ethical if I lived in Portugal during the Salazar regime. • • • • • 
14 Tax evasion is ethical if I was sure I would never get caught • • • • • 
 
 
D. You’ve reached the last section. This part intends to gather personal data. 
 
D1. Gender:  
 
1 Male • 
2 Female • 
 
D2. Age____ 
 
D3. Did you born in Portugal? 
 
1 Yes • 
2 No • 
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D4. How many school years did you complete successfully?______ 
 
D5. Did you ever attend any course in Taxes, Tax Law or related? 
 
1 Yes • 
2 No • 
 
D6. What was the workload in Tax training in the last 12 months? 
 
1 Less than 24 hours • 
2 Between 24 and 48 hours • 
3 More than 48 hours • 
 
D7. When did you get in the Banking industry? ______ 
 
D8. In which bank department are you in? 
 
1 Asset Management • 
2 Treasury and Capital Markets • 
3 Human Resources • 
4 Private Banking • 
5 Operations • 
6 Tax • 
7 Compliance • 
8 Marketing • 
9 IT • 
10 
Other __________________ 
• 
 
D9. Which is your marital status? 
 
1 Married • 
2 Cohabiting   • 
3 Single • 
4 Widowed • 
5 Divorced • 
 
D10. Which of the following describes more closely what do you feel about the current income of people living in your household? 
 
1 The current income allows to live comfortably • 
2 The current income allows to live • 
3 It is difficult to live with the current income • 
4 It is very difficult to live with the current income • 
 
D11. Which is your tax residence district? ____________ 
 
D12. Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are: 
 
1 Not a religious person • 
2 A very religious person • 
 
D13. Do you belong, in the present time, to a religion or religious denomination? 
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1 Yes • 
2 No (Continue to question A15) • 
 
D14. Which one? 
 
1 Catholic • 
2 Protestant • 
3 Orthodox • 
4 Other Christian • 
5 Jewish • 
6 Islamic/Muslim • 
7 Eastern religions • 
8 Non-Christian • 
 
D15. Did you belong, in the past, to a religion or religious denomination? 
 
1 Yes • 
2 No (Continue to question A17) • 
 
D16. Which one? 
 
1 Catholic • 
2 Protestant • 
3 Orthodox • 
4 Other Christian • 
5 Jewish • 
6 Islamic/Muslim • 
7 Eastern religions • 
8 Non-Christian • 
 
D17. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?  
 
1 Daily • 
2 Weekly • 
3 Monthly • 
4 Yearly • 
5 Occasionally • 
6 Never • 
 
D18. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you pray? 
 
1 Daily • 
2 Weekly • 
3 Monthly • 
4 Yearly • 
5 Occasionally • 
6 Never • 
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Table 10 - Attitudes towards tax evasion 
 
  Average 
Score 
1 
Tax evasion is ethical even if tax rates are not too high because the government is 
not entitled to take as much as it is taking from me. 
2,18 
2 Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is wasted. 2,50 
3 Tax evasion is ethical even if most of the money collected is spent wisely. 1,74 
4 
Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects 
that I morally disapprove of. 
2,19 
5 
Tax evasion is ethical even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on 
worthy projects. 
1,93 
6 
Tax evasion is ethical if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects 
that do not benefit me. 
1,97 
7 
Tax evasion is ethical even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on 
projects that do benefit me. 
1,85 
8 Tax evasion is ethical if everyone is doing it. 1,76 
9 Tax evasion is ethical if the probability of getting caught is low. 1,63 
10 Tax evasion is ethical if I can’t afford to pay. 2,19 
11 
Tax evasion is ethical even if it means that if I pay less, others will have to pay 
more. 
1,64 
12 
Tax evasion is ethical if the government discriminates against me because of my 
religion, race or ethnic background. 
2,06 
13 Tax evasion would be ethical if I lived in Portugal during the Salazar regime. 1,93 
14 Tax evasion is ethical if I was sure that I would never get caught. 1,63 
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Table 11 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for the religiosity variable 
 
Even if tax 
rates are 
not too 
high 
because the 
government 
is not 
entitled to 
take as 
much as it 
is taking 
from me 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is 
wasted 
Even if 
most of 
the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
wisely 
If a large 
portion of 
the money 
collected 
is spent on 
projects 
that I 
morally 
disapprove 
of 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
worthy 
projects 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
not 
benefit 
me 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
benefit 
me 
If 
everyone 
is doing 
it 
If the 
probability 
of getting 
caught is 
low 
If I 
can’t 
afford 
to pay 
Even if 
it 
means 
that if I 
pay 
less, 
others 
will 
have to 
pay 
more 
If the 
government 
discriminates 
against me 
because of 
my religion, 
race or 
ethnic 
background 
If I 
lived in 
Portugal 
during 
the 
Salazar 
regime 
If I was 
sure I 
would 
never get 
caught 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
482,000 519,000 473,500 514,000 462,000 453,500 509,000 518,000 473,500 482,500 514,000 506,500 472,500 512,500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
713,000 750,000 1748,500 1789,000 1737,000 1728,500 1784,000 749,000 1748,500 713,500 745,000 737,500 703,500 1787,500 
Z -,570 -,078 -,713 -,146 -,853 -,966 -,219 -,097 -,732 -,563 -,155 -,248 -,707 -,176 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,569 ,937 ,476 ,884 ,394 ,334 ,827 ,923 ,464 ,573 ,877 ,804 ,480 ,860 
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Table 12 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for the age variable 
 
Even if tax 
rates are 
not too 
high 
because the 
government 
is not 
entitled to 
take as 
much as it 
is taking 
from me 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is wasted 
Even if 
most of 
the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
wisely 
If a large 
portion of 
the money 
collected 
is spent on 
projects 
that I 
morally 
disapprove 
of 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
worthy 
projects 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
not 
benefit 
me 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
benefit 
me 
If 
everyone 
is doing 
it 
If the 
probability 
of getting 
caught is 
low 
If I can’t 
afford to 
pay 
Even if it 
means 
that if I 
pay less, 
others 
will have 
to pay 
more 
If the 
government 
discriminates 
against me 
because of 
my religion, 
race or 
ethnic 
background 
If I lived 
in 
Portugal 
during 
the 
Salazar 
regime 
If I was 
sure I 
would 
never get 
caught 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
595,000 539,000 565,500 606,000 549,500 498,000 590,500 555,500 579,000 545,000 572,500 610,000 611,000 579,500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
1261,000 1205,000 1231,500 1272,000 1215,500 1164,000 1256,500 1221,500 1245,000 1175,000 1238,500 1276,000 1277,000 1245,500 
Z -,424 -1,087 -,815 -,290 -,995 -1,628 -,493 -,943 -,662 -1,028 -,738 -,245 -,234 -,650 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,672 ,277 ,415 ,772 ,320 ,103 ,622 ,346 ,508 ,304 ,460 ,806 ,815 ,516 
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Table 13 - Mann-Whitney Test Statistics for the gender variable 
 
Even if tax 
rates are 
not too 
high 
because the 
government 
is not 
entitled to 
take as 
much as it 
is taking 
from me 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is 
wasted 
Even if 
most of 
the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
wisely 
If a large 
portion of 
the money 
collected 
is spent on 
projects 
that I 
morally 
disapprove 
of 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
worthy 
projects 
If a large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
not 
benefit 
me 
Even if a 
large 
portion 
of the 
money 
collected 
is spent 
on 
projects 
that do 
benefit 
me 
If 
everyone 
is doing 
it 
If the 
probability 
of getting 
caught is 
low 
If I 
can’t 
afford 
to pay 
Even if it 
means 
that if I 
pay less, 
others 
will have 
to pay 
more 
If the 
government 
discriminates 
against me 
because of 
my religion, 
race or 
ethnic 
background 
If I lived 
in 
Portugal 
during 
the 
Salazar 
regime 
If I was 
sure I 
would 
never 
get 
caught 
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
484,000 513,000 442,500 474,000 409,000 495,000 489,500 392,500 458,000 486,000 461,500 469,500 458,000 499,500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
1759,000 744,000 1717,500 705,000 1684,000 1770,000 1764,500 1667,500 1733,000 717,000 1736,500 1744,500 1733,000 730,500 
Z -,544 -,157 -1,142 -,676 -1,571 -,405 -,486 -1,838 -,952 -,517 -,893 -,745 -,902 -,359 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,587 ,875 ,253 ,499 ,116 ,685 ,627 ,066 ,341 ,605 ,372 ,456 ,367 ,719 
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Figure 2 - Cluster Analysis - Coefficients Difference  
 
Figure 3 - Outliers 
 
Table 14 - Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Even if tax rates are not too high because the government is not entitled to take as much as it is 
taking from me 
1,000 ,531 
If a large portion of the money collected is wasted 1,000 ,492 
Even if most of the money collected is spent wisely 1,000 ,853 
If a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that I morally disapprove of 1,000 ,620 
Even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on worthy projects 1,000 ,761 
If a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that do not benefit me 1,000 ,776 
Even if a large portion of the money collected is spent on projects that do benefit me 1,000 ,725 
If everyone is doing it 1,000 ,438 
If the probability of getting caught is low 1,000 ,627 
If I can’t afford to pay 1,000 ,474 
Even if it means that if I pay less, others will have to pay more 1,000 ,666 
If the government discriminates against me because of my religion, race or ethnic background 1,000 ,467 
If I lived in Portugal during the Salazar regime 1,000 ,493 
If I was sure I would never get caught 1,000 ,586 
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Table 15 - Alternative hypotheses tests - Attitudes toward tax evasion for the whole sample 
Hypothesis Mean  
p-value 
(µ3) 
Conclusion 
p-value 
(µ2,5) 
Conclusion 
p-value 
(µ1,5) 
Conclusion 
p-value 
(µ1) 
Conclusion 
H1 2,18 ,000 Reject H0 ,010 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H2 2,50 ,001 Reject H0 ,821 Not Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H3 1,74 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,038 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H4 2,19 ,000 Reject H0 ,010 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H5 1,93 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,002 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H6 1,97 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,001 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H7 1,85 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,004 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H8 1,76 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,048 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H9 1,63 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,387 Not Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H10 2,19 ,000 Reject H0 ,007 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H11 1,64 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,293 Not Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H12 2,06 ,000 Reject H0 ,001 Reject H0 ,001 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H13 1,93 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,002 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
H14 1,63 ,000 Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 ,143 Not Reject H0 ,000 Reject H0 
 
